It is not immediately apparent, however, that the judicial burden has been eased by the “bright-line” rules adopted in Miranda. Dickerson v. United States (June 26, 2000) __US__ ISSUE Must law enforcement officers continue to comply with the Miranda procedure, or was Miranda abrogated by Congress 1968? 430, 169 Eng. See Brief for Paul G. Cassell as Amicus Curiae 28–39. Dickerson v. United States, The Oyez Project; Dickerson v. United States, FindLaw; Activity. So the stare decisis argument is a wash. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318 (per curiam). The Court unanimously held that, when a police officer who is conducting a lawful patdown search for weapons feels something that plainly is contraband, the object may be seized even though it is not a weapon. It is not mentioned in the Court’s opinion because, I assume, a majority of the Justices intent on reversing believes that incoherence is the lesser evil. This was true in England, from where American law inherited that rule. 99, 118 (“Mr. So understood, Miranda was objectionable for innumerable reasons, not least the fact that cases spanning more than 70 years had rejected its core premise that, absent the warnings and an effective waiver of the right to remain silent and of the (thitherto unknown) right to have an attorney present, a statement obtained pursuant to custodial interrogation was necessarily the product of compulsion. A contrary conclusion is not required by the fact that the Court has subsequently made exceptions from the Miranda rule, see, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649. The law in this area is clear. Criminal Procedure And Evidence. S 452, 457–458 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 690–691 (1993) (“Miranda’s safeguards are not constitutional in character”); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U. S. 523, 528 (1987) (“[T]he Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights”); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 306 (1985); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 492 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in result). Whether or not this Court would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its rule in the first instance, stare decisis weighs heavily against overruling it now. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. I applaud, therefore, the refusal of the Justices in the majority to enunciate this boundless doctrine of judicial empowerment as a means of rendering today’s decision rational. The totality-of-the-circumstances approach, on the other hand, permits each fact to be taken into account without resort to formal and dispositive labels. In a footnote, the United States directs our attention to certain overprotective First Amendment rules that we have adopted to ensure “breathing space” for expression. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit. With respect to proceedings in state courts, our “authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution.” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U. S. 415, 422 (1991). Moreover, it is not clear why the Court thinks that the “totality-of-the-circumstances test … is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.” Ante, at 14. But as I explained at the outset, that is what is required before the Court may disregard a law of Congress governing the admissibility of evidence in federal court. The Court therefore concluded that something more than the totality test was necessary. In Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967), we concluded that California’s procedure governing withdrawal fell short of the constitutional minimum, and we outlined a procedure that would meet that standard. Petitioner and the United States contend that there is nothing at all exceptional, much less unconstitutional, about the Court’s adopting prophylactic rules to buttress constitutional rights, and enforcing them against Congress and the States. The task of determining whether a defendant is in ‘custody’ has proved to be ‘a slippery one.’ And the supposedly ‘bright’ lines that separate interrogation from spontaneous declaration, the exercise of a right from waiver, and the adequate warning from the inadequate, likewise have turned out to be rather dim and ill defined. See, e.g., King v. Rudd, 1 Leach 115, 117–118, 122–123, 168 Eng. Argued April 19, 2000—Decided June 26, 2000 In the wake of Miranda v. Arizona,384 U. S. 436, in which the Court held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect’s statement made Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000),[1] upheld the requirement that the Miranda warning be read to criminal suspects and struck down a federal statute that purported to overrule Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Of course the seeds of this “prophylactic” interpretation of Miranda were present in the decision itself. As an alternative argument for sustaining the Court of Appeals’ decision, the court-invited amicus curiae7contends that the section complies with the requirement that a legislative alternative to Miranda be equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions. It agreed with the District Court’s conclusion that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings before making his statement. The conclusion that Miranda is constitutionally based is also supported by the fact that that case is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule, see, e.g., 384 U. S., at 445. While “ ‘stare decisis is not an inexorable command,’ ” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991)), particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235 (1997), “even in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some ‘special justification.’ ” United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996) (quoting Payne, supra, at 842 (Souter, J., concurring) (in turn quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984))). That section provides, in relevant part: “(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession … shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Because of the obvious conflict between our decision in Miranda and §3501, we must address whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersede Miranda. Minnesota v. Dickerson 508 U.S. 366 Judicial History The trial court concluded that the seizure of evidence was legal and that pursuant to plain view doctrine did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Following the rule of stare decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.8 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore. While Congress has ultimate authority to modify or set aside any such rules that are not constitutionally required, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S. 343, 345–348, it may not supersede this Court’s decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution, see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 517–521. The additional remedies cited by amicus do not, in our view, render them, together with §3501 an adequate substitute for the warnings required by Miranda. Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted §3501. As the Court today acknowledges, since Miranda we have explicitly, and repeatedly, interpreted that decision as having announced, not the circumstances in which custodial interrogation runs afoul of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, but rather only “prophylactic” rules that go beyond the right against compelled self-incrimination. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances”). In nonetheless joining the Court’s judgment, however, they overlook two truisms: that actions speak louder than silence, and that (in judge-made law at least) logic will out. Whereas we have insisted that congressional action under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be “congruent” with, and “proportional” to, a constitutional violation, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 520 (1997), the Miranda nontextual power to embellish confers authority to prescribe preventive measures against not only constitutionally prohibited compelled confessions, but also (as discussed earlier) foolhardy ones.
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